

# MIRAGE: Mitigating Conflict-Based Cache Attacks with a Practical Fully-Associative Design


*A design to eliminate eviction-sets & cache attacks*

USENIX Security 2021

**Gururaj Saileshwar** and **Moinuddin Qureshi**




# Problem: CPU Cache Side-Channels



Shared LLC helps improve performance,  
But timing difference (LLC Hit vs Miss) leads to side-channels!

# Problem: CPU Cache Side-Channels




# Problem: CPU Cache Side-Channels



## Prime+Probe Attack


[Bernstein'05],[Perceival'05],  
Liu et al. [S&P'15]

Shared  
Cache Set




Last Level Cache  
(Set-Associative)

# Problem: CPU Cache Side-Channels




# Problem: CPU Cache Side-Channels



Spy can Leak Victim Secrets like AES/RSA Keys, User Key-Strokes, etc.


# Randomized Cache Defenses

## Prime+Probe Attack




# Randomized Cache Defenses

## Prime+Probe Attack




## Randomized Cache Defenses

[MICRO'18], [ISCA'19], [SEC'19], [NDSS'20], [S&P'21]




# Randomized Cache Defenses

## Prime+Probe Attack




## Randomized Cache Defenses

[MICRO'18], [ISCA'19], [SEC'19], [NDSS'20], [S&P'21]




Successive Defenses Broken  
By Newer Attacks

# Arms Race Between Attacks & Defenses



# Arms Race Between Attacks & Defenses




Our Goal: Eliminate Set-Conflicts to End the Arms Race

# Goal: Fully-associative Randomized LLC


## Abstraction to SW

*Fully-Associative: No Set Conflicts*



 **Principled Security**

**Challenge: Naive Fully-Associative Lookup Requires Checking 100,000+ LLC Locations**




 **Impractical Lookup Latency & Power**

# Goal: Fully-associative Randomized LLC

## Abstraction to SW


*Fully-Associative: No Set Conflicts*



✓ **Principled Security**

## Traditional

## Set-Associative Lookup




✓ **Practical Lookup within Set (16-32 Locations)**


Key Challenge: How to get Security of Fully-Associative Design (No Set-Conflicts) with Set-Associative Lookups?

# Insight: Use Load-Balancing to Eliminate Set-Conflicts

## Buckets & Balls Problem




## Set-Associative Randomized LLC




# Insight: Use Load-Balancing to Eliminate Set-Conflicts

## 16 Balls in 4 Buckets (C=4)




Bucket Overflow Every Ball Throw

## 16 Balls in 4 Buckets (C=8)




Bucket Overflow Likelihood Reduced, But Still Possible

## 16 Balls in 4 Buckets (C=8) & Power of 2 Choices [Mitzenmacher'96]




Bucket Overflow Improbable: Balanced Distribution

# Security Guarantee With Power of 2 Choices




# Security Guarantee With Power of 2 Choices




LLC with 75% extra capacity & Power of 2 Choices Indexing has Security Guarantee of 1 SAE Per  $10^{34}$  LLC Installs ( $10^{17}$  years)

# MIRAGE Design


Extra Tags Cheap, Extra Data Expensive (1:10)




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
# MIRAGE Design



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
**Security Guarantee: With 75% extra tags, MIRAGE ensures 1 Set-Associative Eviction that can leak information every  $10^{34}$  LLC Installs (once in  $10^{17}$  years)**

***Eliminates Conflict-Based Attacks***


# MIRAGE: Shared Memory Attacks

## Randomization Alone Cannot Mitigate Shared-Memory Attacks

(e.g. Flush+Reload, Flush+Flush)




## MIRAGE uses Domain-ID for duplication of shared cache lines



***Eliminates Shared-Memory Based Attacks***

# Results - Performance

Simulation of 8-Core 16MB/16-way LLC system on Trace-Based Simulator




2% Slowdown, 20% Storage Overhead (75% extra tags).  
Storage-Neutral Slowdown → 3.5%.

**Paper includes MIRAGE-Lite with lower storage overheads (50% extra tags & similar security)**

*Additional Results in Paper: LLC Misses, Lookup Latency, Logic Overhead, RISC-V, Gem5 etc.*

# Takeaways from MIRAGE



## Principled Security that Eliminates Cache-Attacks Leaking Victim Addresses

- **Strong Benefits:** Security of 1 SAE per  $10^{17}$  Years
- **Modest Costs:** 2% Slowdown, 17% - 20% Storage Overhead

# Thanks!

Code



Slides




Paper



Code (Gem5 Artifact): <https://github.com/gururaj-s/mirage>

Slides: [http://memlab.ece.gatech.edu/slides/SEC\\_2021\\_1\\_slides.pptx](http://memlab.ece.gatech.edu/slides/SEC_2021_1_slides.pptx)

Paper: <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21fall-saileshwar.pdf>



**Gururaj Saileshwar**

[gururaj.s@gatech.edu](mailto:gururaj.s@gatech.edu)



**Moinuddin Qureshi**

[moin@gatech.edu](mailto:moin@gatech.edu)